I. INTRODUCTION
The dissonance between international criminal law, as it is currently developing, and the Islamic world is great. Likewise, the gulf between the criminal law of Western societies and that of Islamic societies is a wide one. Indeed, Westerners often only have tragic and brutal stories of stoning and honor killing on which to base their perspectives of the Muslim world. Treatment of women often lies along the deepest recess of this chasm. But that is slowly beginning to change in countries where Shari‛a (traditional Islamic law) is not prevalent enough to block it. The tragic yet hopeful story of Fawaz and Zahra demonstrate how this can happen:
The struggle, if there was any, would have been very brief. Fawaz later recalled that his wife, Zahra, was sleeping soundly on her side and curled slightly against the pillow when he rose at dawn and readied himself for work at his construction job on the outskirts of Damascus. It was a rainy Sunday morning in January and very cold; as he left, Fawaz turned back one last time to tuck the blanket more snugly around his 16-year-old wife. Zahra slept on without stirring, and her husband locked the door of their tiny apartment carefully behind him.
Zahra was most likely still sleeping when her older brother, Fayyez, entered the apartment a short time later, using a stolen key and carrying a dagger. . . . [He] stabbed her five times in the head and back: brutal, tearing thrusts that shattered the base of her skull and nearly severed her spinal column. Leaving the door open, Fayyez walked downstairs and out to the local police station. There, he reportedly turned himself in, telling the officers on duty that he had killed his sister in order to remove the dishonor she had brought on the family by losing her virginity out of wedlock nearly 10 months earlier.
"Fayyez told the police, 'It is my right to correct this error . . . . It's true that my sister is married now, but we never washed away the shame.'" By now, almost anyone in Syria who follows the news can supply certain basic details about Zahra al-Azzo's life and death: how the girl, then only 15, was kidnapped in the spring of 2006 near her home in northern Syria, taken to Damascus by her abductor and raped; how the police who discovered her feared that her family, as commonly happens in Syria, would blame Zahra for the rape and kill her; how these authorities then placed Zahra in a prison for girls, believing it the only way to protect her from her relatives. And then in December, how a cousin of Zahra's, 27-year-old Fawaz, agreed to marry her in order to secure her release and also, he hoped, restore her reputation in the eyes of her family; how, just a month after her wedding to Fawaz, Zahra's 25-year-old brother, Fayyez, stabbed her as she slept. . . .
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Under Syrian law, an honor killing is not murder, and the man who commits it is not a murderer. As in many other Arab countries, even if the killer is convicted on the lesser charge of a "crime of honor," he is usually set free within months. Mentioning the killing -or even the name of the victim -generally becomes taboo.
That this has not happened with Zahra's story -that her case... has become something of a cause célèbre, a rallying point for lawyers, Islamic scholars and Syrian officials hoping to change the laws that protect the perpetrators of honor crimes -is a result of a peculiar confluence of circumstances. . . . But at heart it is because of Zahra's young widower, Fawaz, who had spoken to his bride only once before they became engaged. Now, defying his tribe and their traditions, he has brought a civil lawsuit against Zahra's killer and is refusing to let her case be forgotten. 1 Honor killings have a long tradition in some parts of the Muslim world, although they are neither mandated nor sanctioned by Islam. In highly conservative Islamic societies, the small change in thinking that is beginning as a tentative bloom in the sands of Syria remains unthinkable. From that rigid perspective, the post-modern, highly secularized thinking in Western society is simply beyond the pale. That is why Imams have been known to issue fatwas against Pokémon -a child's cartoon character in the Japanese anime style.
2
It is a truism that there are multiple levels of incongruency between Islamic societies and Western societies.
3
Some of these differences are obvious, like those concerning treatment of women, recognition of civil liberties, degree of societal religious adherence/tolerance, and the seriousness with which pluralistic liberal representative democratic institutions are supported. Others are less so. Many differences are based on values, tradition, and the continued existence of a vibrant tribal life, especially in Arab and African societies, that pre-date Islam but that continue to exist overlaid by Islam.
4 Do these incongruencies rise to the level of incompatibility?
Women's rights advocate, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim, Somali woman and Dutch parliamentarian, reinforces this message of incompatibility everywhere she goes: "The 21st In the wake of 9/11, many were moved to give renewed credence to Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington's dire prediction of civilizational warfare 6 in the context of pitting Islamic society against Western society. Figure 1 graphically depicts this diametric opposition of Islam to the West: 
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source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. 7
While Huntington demurred on the question of whether a clash of civilizations was actually occurring after 9/11, he left that possibility open. 8 Corollary to this supposition of societal incompatibility, which is no doubt true in some degree, is the general observation that most international criminal law structures are based upon Western models. Thus, the argument that such legal norms and institutions are also largely incongruent with Islamic societies should come as no surprise. The trial of Saddam Hussein by Muslim judges attempting to use a Western-style judicial institution is a case-in-point.
The Iraqi High Tribunal ("IHT") was conceived and constructed by Western attorneys working for the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"). The statute of the IHT grafted important Western concepts like due process, defense protections, and evidentiary standards, which would be found in most international criminal tribunals, onto a domestic criminal court within the post-war Iraqi legal system. That Saddam's trial was a chaotic affair, beset by difficulties from the beginning, evinced the failure of this graft to take. Muslim Iraqi judges operating within an Islamic society attempted valiantly to operate the Western machinery, but to little avail. The Saddam trial and its aftermath have been round- 12 While geographic dispersal loosely tracks OIC membership combined with practicing population statistics per state (see map below), diversity among Islamic states is widespread, creating a heterogeneous mosaic of states as opposed to a monolithic "civilization" as Huntington might argue. 
a. Institutional Diversity
Key diversity factors revolve around geography, ethnicity and cultural differentiation. Degree and type of tribalism also come into play. Yet one might generalize that all Islamic societies tend to be more socially conservative. However, it is still 12 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, Algeria (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/-ag.html. 13 HUNTINGTON, supra note 6. 25 This is born out in key provisions of Iran's constitution, which glosses the law with heavy religious overtones -including identifying God as the supreme source of legislation:
Article 2 -The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:
1. The One God, His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands; 2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws; 3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God; [and] 4. The justice of God in creation and legislation.
Article 4 -All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council [Pakistan] is an Islamic republic, and the Constitution requires that laws be consistent with Islam. The Constitution states that "subject to law, public order and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion;" however, in practice the Government imposes limits on freedom of religion. Islam is the state religion. Freedom of speech is constitutionally "subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam." The country was created to be a homeland for Muslims, although its founders did not envisage it as an Islamic state. 22 
26
By comparison, the tone of similar provisions in Turkey's secular constitution, reveals the degree of political diversity within the Muslim world -especially as it relates to the underlying character of the laws in those countries:
Article 2 -The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.
Article 12 -Everyone possesses inherent fundamental rights and freedoms which are inviolable and inalienable....
Article 13 -Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular Republic and the principle of proportionality.
27
A sense of religious overtone to the law itself has significant consequences for how populations interact with the law and the state. Iran, unlike Turkey, operates on the basis of Islamic law reigning supreme and clerics controlling the laws that are promulgated and enforced.
28
III. LEGAL DIVERGENCE: COMPLETE INCOMPATIBILITY?
Indeed, what is Islamic law? The origins of Islamic law date to the 7 th Century founding of the religion. Shari‛a (root: shara'a ‫)عرش‬ is a term used to denote divinely inspired Islamic law, which means "the way" as used in the Qur'an 45:18 -"Then We put thee on the (right) Way of Religion: so follow thou that (Way), and follow not the desires of those who know 26 When looked at in Europe for over a century, "Islamic law" could only disappoint, and in fact was made to disappoint. It could never match any version of European law. It was ineffective, inefficient, even incompetent. It was thought mostly to apply to personal status, having at an early stage 'divorced' itself from 'state and society.' Its penal law was a little more burlesque, 'never had much importance,' and was in fact downright 'deficient.' Of course, much of this was colonialist discourse and potent doctrine, cumulatively but programmatically designed to desiccate the Shari‛a and replace it with Western codes and institutions. . . . These stereotypes remain tenacious. . . . 30 Consequently, there is a bit of defensiveness pushing back from the Muslim legal world against Western presumptions against their systems, to the extent that those systems exist intact or were resurrected after colonialism ended.
a. Sources & Nature of Islamic Law
The sources of Shari‛a are:
The Qur'an, which is infallible;
The Sunnah -ancient traditional interpretive guides to the Qur'an functioning as a living example of Muhammad;
The Fiqh -the body of Islamic jurisprudence including the rulings of judges and Islamic scholars that direct and apply Shari‛a to individual Muslims in their daily livesl reasoning of jurists; inclusive of:
The Qiyas -analogica The Ijma -consensus
31
As with any legal system, there is a divergence of Shari‛a interpretation even within the predominantly Muslim states that utilize it. Every Muslim agrees on the authority of the Qur'an as it is the word of God. Sunni and Shi'a Muslims disagree about which aspects of the Sunnah to follow depending upon which ancient scholar authored portions of the Sunnah: Sunni Muslims tend to follow all of it, while Shi'a Muslims Deterrence is the key goal for these infractions, thus the harshness of the punishment.
42 The Saudi's have long claimed that the low crime rate within the Kingdom compared to that in other predominantly Muslim states that do not wholly incorporate Shari‛a is irrefutable proof that deterrence works in their society -a claim that tern social scientists.
43
Moreover, Hadd punishments must be administered sequentially, so if a person is convicted of theft, slander, and drinking alcohol, the punishments follow in sequence: amputa- 37 
44
Because Hadd punishments are harsh, the evidentiary standard is high. Only confessions made in court are valid, witness testimony must come from two Muslim men of good standing (or one Muslim man and two Muslim women), and circumstantial evidence is not admitted if retaliation is demanded.
45
Since these are crimes against God, repentance, if proved, can exculpate one being tried for a Hadd crime. "By showing his repentance, the offender actually proves that he has already not need to be punished anymore."
46
That said, there remains inte rely inflict these punishments.
If a person cannot be sentenced to a fixed punishment for a hadd offence because of lack of evidence, although it is otherwise plausible that he is guilty of it, he may be sentenced to discretionary punishment. For such sentences the strict rules of evidence do not apply. Circumstantial evidence is al sumptions based on a person's reputation.
47
While crimes are circumscribed under Islamic law, elements of crimes are often not codified. "There are very few general principles in Islamic criminal law."
48 Consequently, the criminal justice system is ripe for abuse -especially if there are no real democr t. How homicide is treated under classic Shari‛a provides one with a glimpse into this system. The objectives pursued for homicide prosecution are a combination of retribution and retaliation. Retaliation is only allowed "if the victim's bloodprice is the same as or higher than the offender's."
49 Financial compensation for murder is handled on the civil side of the ledger, not the criminal side, in the U.S. -as was famously demonstrated in the California state tri O.J. Simpson in the 1990's.
50
The prosecution is a decidedly victim-driven endeavor, as opposed to criminal prosecution in Western societies where victims play no role other than possibly as witnesses to the crime.
51
Under Islamic law, the victim's surviving family 44 serves as the prosecution in an adversarial process. Continuance of the prosecution is dependent up s family -they can withdraw at any time, and the killer may be pardoned by the victim's family.
If a defendant's guilt is proven, the victim's family may demand retaliation or blood money. Financial compensation varies with the victim's sex, religion and legal status (the blood price of a woman is half that of a man). Retaliation is allowed if killing was intentional, otherwise the victim's family is entitled to financial compensation. Retaliation involves inflicting the same wounds on the perpetrator as the victim endured (eye for an eye; life for a life logic prevails here). The victim's family also may carry out the execution of a death sentence under the supervision of a state agent, but the potential executioner must demonst of kin, the state undertakes prosecution and punishment.
52
Only confessions and eyewitness testimony are admissible for homicide under Shari‛a; no circumstantial evidence is admitted.
53 Mens Rea concepts are also in play: "[An] offender must have had the power to commit or not to commit the act (qudra); must have known ('ilm) that the act was an offense; and must have acted with intent (qasd)."
54 Thus, minors and the insane do not qualify as prosecutable perpetrators. Moreover, killing an attacker in elf or one's relatives is lawful if the act is proportional to the acts of the attacker.
55
The question of the intent of the murderer is more objectified under Islamic law, wh rds degrees of homicide. However, intent is ascertainable om the crime scene itself:
In Islamic law, intent is discerned from the manner in which a crime is committed, in particular the type of weapon used. The assumption is that an individual intending to kill will use a weapon with lethal capabilities. Relying m nd of the offender at 
b. Usage of Shari‛a
62
Iran is an active death penalty state, employing hanging on a regular basis, and since the 1979 revolution, it has reinstituted amputation as a punishment for criminal conduct in accordance with Islamic law. However, Iranian judges have recently begun the practice of double amputations -ordering the right hand and right foot cut off so that walking for the survivor is nearly impossible even with a crutch or cane. According to the judicial branch in Sis ertaking these more extreme measures, deterrence is the stated goal for this policy. 63 The strictest aspects of Shari‛a were, of course, in play un- Muslims, in order to be good Muslims, must live in an Islamic state, a state which implements Shari‛a. It is not sufficient that that such a state gives Muslims the choice to follow or not to follow the Shari‛a, it must actually impose the Shari‛a on them, by implementing Islamic criminal law . . . . The establishment of an Islamic state is presented as a religious duty for all Muslims and as an endeavor that may bring Paradise within their reach. And there is another felicitous prospect connected with it: that of a pious and virtuous community on earth that enjoys God's favour and is actively aided by Him to overcome poverty and humiliation. . . . The reintroduction of Islamic criminal law is, from this perspective, a step towards salvation in the Hereafter as well as in this life. It is, therefore, much more than a merely technical reform of penal law. The notions connected with it make the project of enforcing Islamic criminal law attractive to both the ruling elite and large parts of the Muslim population. 67 Although some aspects of Shari‛a may be in play for an Islamic state, that is not to say that the population or government would support a complete imposition of Islamic law for all Malaysia's highest court has ruled that legal cases involving nonMuslims cannot be decided by Shari'a courts, drawing a line after a spate of high-profile cases that left many in legal limbo. The Federal court, in a landmark judgment, held that disputes between a Muslim and a non-Muslim on family and Islamic matters should be settled in a civil court. 66 According to Dubai's court system, civil and criminal courts generally retain jurisdiction appealable up to a court of cassation, but Shari'a courts have some influence: Sharia or Islamic courts work alongside the civil and criminal courts in the UAE. The Sharia court is the Islamic court in the UAE and is primarily responsible for civil matters between Muslims. Non-Muslims will not appear before a Sharia court in any matter. Sharia courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear family disputes, including matters involving divorce, inheritances, child custody, child abuse and guardianship of minors. In the absence of any particular provision in the UAE codified law, the Islamic principles of Sharia as found in the Islamic Sharia textbooks are applied.
The Sharia court may, at the federal level only (which, as mentioned earlier, excludes Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah), also hear appeals of certain criminal cases including rape, robbery, driving under the influence of alcohol and related crimes, which were originally tried in lower criminal courts. . Thus, Nigeria now has dual criminal stice systems that nevertheless feed ultimately into a Supreme Court, albeit after passing through dual appellate processes en route. 70 riminal law in a similar fashion? Such a duality is already arguably in play with rew in section IV. Whether this offers a aspects of the law. The recent Red Mosque uprising centered on the Pakistani government's resistance to the imposition of the restrictive Taliban version of Shari‛a concerning family law advocated by Islamists in Pakistan.
68
Furthermore, the level of Shari‛a usage may not be uniform even within a state. The Islamic parts of a state that are overwhelmingly Muslim may develop Islamic criminal s within the framework of the larger state. Nigeria is a recent example. 69 States within Nigeria, like those within the U.S., have the power to enact their own criminal law.
Between January 2000 and April 2002, twelve northern Nigerian states introduced the criminal aspects of Shari‛a, set up Shari‛a courts and adopted Shari‛a penal codes conforming to the Malikite school ju 
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74 in ini e. All that is required is for an Islamic
c. Divergence of the Legal Culture
Justice is swift in Muslim societies -particularly in those that practice Shari‛a. 71 Criminal justice systems in the Muslim world tend to operate on shorter time horizons than they do in the West. This is especially true in Arab societies, where the cultural paradigm reflects a preference for quick rewards and punishments. Such tension played out dramatically during the trial of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, culminating in his hastily organized execution on December 30, 2006.
72
Another case in point is Saudi Arabia. Criminal trials in Saudi Arabia are conducted rapidly, many turning on coerced confessions resulting from beatings and torture while in confinement. 73 Punishment ensues shortly thereafter. This is in line with the traditional view of an Islamic judge's role. "'Razing injustice' was the [judge's] unqualified duty, to be fulfilled effectively and without undue delay. Protracted adjudication and postponements in the judicial process were thus abhorred, and deemed to aggravate injustice."
Indeed, upon restituting strict Shari'a in post-Shah Iran, Ayatollah Khome said:
Islamic justice is based on simplicity and ease. It settles all criminal and civil complaints and in the most convenient, elementary, and expeditious way possibl judge, with pen and inkwell and two or three enforcers, to go into a town, come to his verdict in any kind of case, and have it immediately carried out.
75
In contrast, criminal trials in Western states are more protracted in both common law and civil law societies. Such trials are often followed by extensive appeals opportunities, especially when the sentence is death. Modern international criminal tribunals follow the Western model in this regard, and trials can stretch into years, 
IV. ISLAM & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
At least in its procedural aspects, it is said that "international procedural criminal law originates from and draws considerably on human rights law. . . . The notion of human rights underpinning the legitimacy of international criminal procedures was clearly envisaged by the 1946 judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal . . . ."
77 Thus, the natural connection between human rights and inter red. It is instructive to review the efforts taken by many states in the Islamic world to set themselves apart from the international human rights regime that has developed since the end of the Second World War.
Many Islamic states that incorporate Shari‛a belong to treaties outlawing international crimes as well as human rights conventions. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a member of the Convention Against Torture, 78 the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 79 and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 80 and is also a member of the Genocide Convention.
81 However, Saudi interpretation of rights contained therein is rather restrictive. No one would reasonably en in the anti-discrimination treaty are observed in Riyadh on the same basis as they are in Oslo, yet both Saudi Arabia and Norway are parties to the same convention. This is true of torture as well.
Yet, beyond interpretation, there is also a fundamental disagreement concerning the very package of rights guaranteed. From the Islamic perspective, Islamic human rights are actually more universal than those prescribed by U.N. conventions because it extends to all individual's belief in God. 87 and individual freedoms such as spe al liberty" with God's will -which, in Islam, is always superior to the will of man. Islam, moreover, stresses the duties of believers while international human rights law stresses the rights of man.
For example, adultery is one of the gravest crimes in Islam t is not considered a serious crime under international law ven Muslim defenders of an Islamic version of human rights mit this incongruency:
The most significant difference between modern westernized attitudes towards human rights and their implementation and an Islamic perspective is the function of religion in general and the position of God in particular. Whereas God hardly finds his place anymore in Western lay societies, he is the seat of justice uslim world. Islam sees God as the ultimate source of justice, which includes the Human Rights. The main goal of God's message to human kind is the attainment of Justice. At this point there is a strong connection between Justice and Islam. 83 Thus, the Islamic view of human rights, especially in Shari‛a states, diverges from the Western view and therefore from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR") -which Iran called a secular interpretation of the Judeo-Ch n which could not be followed by Muslims in good faith. The Western consensus on this Shari‛a-based alternative to human rights is that, in principle, the Muslim world should not be allowed to create a valid exception to international human rights norms. To do so denies the common humanity shared by all people, and universally recognized minimum standards of treatment are, of course, the main object an
V. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The internationalization of criminal law, which began in earnest with the trial of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg in 1946, has gained traction since the end of the Cold War. A proliferation of international institutions has given rise to a variety of structural models available for the prosecution and adjudication of violations of international criminal law. Yet very few Islamic jurists or Islamic states participate in the i
tional Diversity
Two ad hoc tribunals, created by the U.N. Security Council to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, were designed to be temporary in nature with narrowly prescribed territorial, subject-matter and temporal jurisdiction. They were, and still are, staffed by international legal specialists not drawn from the countries in which the atrocities took p oved from the those states as well. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague, and the International Criminal 89 Cairo Declaration, Article 5(a): "The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right."
90 Cairo Declaration, Article 20: "It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an individual to medical or scientific experimentation without his consent or at the risk of his health or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions." 91 Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), located in Arusha Tanzania, both began operations in 1993. Each court is considered successful in that each added vital justice elements to the conflicts they are associated with, achieved a relatively high degree of interaction among the legal academy, and continue to produce complex legal opinions that furth ternational criminal law. Nevertheless, the international community quickly came to recognized that a chief weakness to the ad hoc systems centered on a lack of involvement (and investment) by the local community. In short, the ad hoc tribunals were over-internationalized.
An attempt to remedy this central weakness was the creation of a hybridized model. Following conclusion of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the U.N. worked with the local government to create a tribunal that contained both local and international judges, prosecutors, and staff, and was physically located in the country where the crimes occurred. U.N. officials sou eate a similar model for Cambodia, as the government began to pursue surviving former members of the Khmer Rouge that participated in the 1975 genocide. That effort has not been as successful as the Sierra Leone effort due, in large part, to political issues on the Cambodian side of the equation. 92 In addition to the ad hoc and hybrid models, both meant to be temporary in nature, a permanent model has emerged with the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002. Located in The Hague and staffed with international experts, the theory behind the ICC is that a venue will be available when local courts canno dictions. Moreover, it is meant to be shielded from the potential for politicization and serve as a larger deterrent to despotic conduct than previous institutions. Perhaps tellingly, all of the ICC's prosecutorial activity to date has concerned situations in Africa.
93
A final model may lie in the Lockerbie trial examplewhich could be considered the ultimate form of ad hoc-ism. This was a special court that resulted from a political settlement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya to try two Muslim Libyan intelligence agents for t tland. The trial was held in The Hague at Camp Zeist but tried under Scottish law and before Scottish judges. 
b. Muslim Participation
International criminal law has come to focus mainly on only three types of atrocity: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. A fourth crime, aggression, was tried at Nuremberg and Tokyo, but has not been tried since. It is an inchoate, undefined crime within the Rome Statute for the ICC. 96 Islamic States have largely signed onto treaties outlawing thes ningfully in the institutions that investigate and prosecute them.
Nevertheless, Islamic societies have had some level of interaction with these three crimes in the contex of these international and domestic tribunals: The Iraqi High Tribunal ("IHT") is the only Arab nexus of these five tribunals, three of which are domestic courts, one is an analogue to a hybrid court, and one is a full-blown international tribunal. All of these tribunals, including the three do- 102 This will be the first International Tribunal to depart
